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Abstract 
The monetary policy transmission mechanism Is analyzed in this 
paper with the help of a relatively standard macroeconometric model of 
the Spanish economy. A temporary increase in policy-set interest rates 
under different exchange rate regimes is simulated, and a careful 
decomposition of the channels of transmission of the shock is performed. 
The exercise highlights the importance of both business investment and 
the exchange rate in the transmission process. The influence of the 
business cycle is also taken into consideration. 

O. Introduction 
The present document describes the impact of a monetary shock 
simulated with the MOl SEES model, and summarises the conclusions that 
can be drawn from the exercise. The original definition of the shock, 
suggested by the BIS, envisaged a temporary and a permanent interest 
rate increase both with fully flexible and fixed exchange rates. The 
experiment had to be carried out with the macroeconomic models of a 
number of central hanks, and an important aspect was to differentiate 
clearly between the responses attributable to the structure of the 
models and to the true underlying financial structures. 
The two simulations outlined in the document exactly match the 
final agreed-upon definition of the shocks: a temporary increase in the 
(nominal) intervention rate in 1994-1995, and an immediate return to 
baseline; and the same exercise with a path of foreign interest rates 
compatible with a stable nominal exchange rate. Further evidence is 
gathered by decomposing the channels of transmission of the shock. 
The note is structured as follows. A first section, following this 
one, will outline the general properties of the MOISEES model. The 
particularities of the model will be linked to its background: the specific 
needs it was to cover, and its usage. A brief explanation of some of its 
most important blocks will be given, with special emphasis on the 
financial block, and the most important planned improvements will be 
summarised. A second section will discuss the actual simulations 
performed, and the changes in the model that a proper handling of the 
exercise made necessary. Results of the chosen simulations will be 
discussed in this section, as will further evidence gathered through 
additional experimentation. A third section will describe an attempt at 
decomposing the most important channels of transmission of the 
monetary shock, and their relation to the true underlying channels, 
indicating the most troublesome points of the procedure. The last 
section will summarise the main conclusions of the exercise. 
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1. General structure of the model. 
1. 1. General background to the model. 
The MOl SEES model was first estimated in the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy at the end of the eighties. Its main use there was to simulate 
alternative scenarios, always with a baseline constructed around 8 
forecast not directly related to the model itself. The rationale behind its 
structure was that a small, highly aggregated general-equilibrium model 
was better suited to the calibration of fiscal policy than a huge 
macroeconomic model or a host of small partial-equilibrium models. The 
fiscal sector , or fiscal block, of the model was large relative to the rest 
of the model, as this was one of the characteristics that could help in 
introducing specific fiscal policy shocks into the model. The monetary 
block, on the other hand, was extremely poor due to the lack of 
financial structure, as this was not a major issue at the Ministry. 
The model was lent to the Bank of Spain, where a major re­
specification is being undertaken in order to turn it into 8 more 
manageable tool for monetary policy analysis. The Research Department 
of the Bank of Spain has other quantitative tools, and the model is not 
meant to replace all these but rather to complement them in those fields 
where it may have some advantages. In particular, the model is not 
used, nor will it be used in the near future, for regular monetary policy 
programming, for which partial-equilibrium, medium- to short-term 
models are preferred. The implication of this complementarity is that the 
model is not expected to depict the short-run impact of an alternative 
scenario as accurately as other tools at the Bank, while its long-run 
behaviour has to be carefully gauged as this is the field where the model 
can excel. The model is, as a consequence, increasingly becoming a 
long-run analysis tool. This is the justification of the widespread use 
of co-integration techniques in the re-estimation of the model. 
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The model is annual, with an historical database beginning in 
1964, although some series go as far back as 1954. Most of the structure 
of the model closely follows the current National Accounts structure, 
the database being a homogenised version of the Spanish National 
Accounts based in 1986. As a consequence, the real economy (real 
output and demand) is better portrayed than the financial side of the 
economy. The MOISEES model is from this point of view a fairly 
standard macroeconomic model. We plan soon to introduce some Financial 
Accounts considerations as an important add-on to the structure of the 
model. These and other changes will be explained in a later section. 
1. 2. Brief description of blocks in the model. 
This section will give a rough description of the general structure 
of the model, and the different blocks incorporating it. Rather than 
going into detail, a comprehensive bibliographic reference will be 
given. All we need for this document is a general understanding of some 
key points of its structure that will help us in the comprehension of the 
transmission of the particular shock envisaged. 
The model was built at the Ministry of Economy around a 
particular supply block that embraced the idea that the economy is 
bound to undergo all kinds of shortages. Three types of shortage were 
envisaged for individual firms: a shortage of demand, a shortage of 
labour supply and a shortage of capital stock. Aggregate supply was 
considered to undergo all three shortages to differing degrees, as the 
share of firms enduring a specific type of shortage is time-varying. The 
shortage of demand is considered to be a Keynesian regime, while a 
capital stock shortage is considered to be a potential-output regime and 
a shortage of labour supply a classical regime. The final outcome after 
aggregating firms is an economy where an equilibrium Is never fully 
reached, as there will always be firms undergoing some kind of 
shortage. Within this framework, the Interesting point is what kind of 
shortage is proportionately the most important. This is a key 
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consideration when judging if fiscal policy has to affect demand (a 
mostly Keynesian' economy, or an economy under a strong Keynesian 
regime), the labour market (a mostly classical economy) or the capital 
markets (an economy nearing its potential output point). The 
underpinnings of this block are explalned in full detail in other 
publications (see [I), (3) and (6». 
Another important block, both for understanding the model and 
for it,S great implications in the simulations that follow, is the wages­
prices formation mechanism. Two equations concur in determlning the 
price and nominal waltB level, following the Layard-Jackman-Nickell 
framework. An explicit wage-bargaining process is modelled, and the 
relative strength of labour unions and firms is a key factor explaining 
the wage-price spiral. Other important factors are the tax wedge, 
productivity growth and the unemployment level. The short-run 
Phillips curve has explicitly some degree of slope. A problem with this 
type of framework is the indetermination of what sets the price level: 
at first glance it seems that the general price level is fully determined 
in the labour market; but this may be misleading, as in a general­
equilibrium framework both equations may only be explaining the wage­
price spiral, but not the specific level at which it is happening. This 
particular point was worth testing thoroughly, and after much 
experimentation the conclusion was reached that the price level was 
uniquely determined by the level of liquid assets. The model was found 
to have a neutral monetary policy in the long-run (see ( 10)). 
The demand block is quite standard: a private consumption 
equation, a business and a residential investment equation, and 
equations for both imports and exports. A relevant fact in the 
consumption equation is the particular role played by wealth; wealth as 
included in the model embraces all forms of assets in private hands. In 
particular, it includes all liquid asset holdings, not netted out with 
credits, implying strongly non-rational agents. This is not the case, as 
the variable has been included in the equation to ensure that a long-run 
unit elasticity of consumption and disposable income is achieved. As will 
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be shown later, the long-run impact of wealth on consumption is not an 
outstanding feature in the simulations. This is not the case in the 
short-run, though. Accelerations in wealth greatly affect the short-run 
behaviour of consumption, and this is mainly felt in the second year 
after a monetary shock is given. This factor may be more related to the 
model than to the real economy, as alternative specifications of the 
equation, particularly when net financial wealth is included, change 
this behaviour significantly. 
The business investment equation is much more straightforward, 
and its response seems to capture well the general behaviour of this 
aggregate. Residential investment, however, lacks a proper housing 
prices variable, although this may be a factor of secondary importance. 
Unfortunately, the model lacks endogenous mortgage rates. 
The trade balance is determined by one equation explaining 
imports, and another explaining exports of goods and services 
excluding tourism. This exclusion may be relevant once the exchange 
rate is allowed to move. Both equations show great sensitivity to 
changes in competitiveness, and imports show a significant short-run 
response to changes in business investment, a most relevant factor 
affecting the outcome of most of the simulations carried out with the 
model. 
The fiscal block has no behavioural equations, but it has a lot of 
reaction functions that attempt to mirror some of the simplest rules 
followed by the fiscal au thorities in setting spending. These rules vary 
with the particular component, but most of them are set as a proportion 
of lagged nominal GDP (implying a decision rule that sets spending the 
year before it is actually spent). Government revenues react to the 
economic situation in a quite automatic way, the only exception being 
direct taxes. Indirect taxes, social security revenues and other 
important components are directly linked to the variables they tax 
(consumption, employee compensation, etc). Direct taxes, on the other 
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hand, are linked to nominal GDP with an elasticity implying a positive 
and lasting effect of inflation. This relatively strong non-neutrality of 
direct taxes has far-reaching implications in the long-run behaviour of 
the model. This matter will be thoroughly addressed. The final picture 
is that of real spending and revenues with some degree of inertia in 
nominal terms. The implications are that the government is impacted in 
the short run by a fall in inflation. 
Net government interest payments are fully modelled, including 
an implied jnterest rate that closely follows the long-term interest rate 
of the model, and an endogenous debt. 
A good general account of the full model may be found in [3]. 
1. 3. The financial block. 
The financial block merits special attention. Its structure is 
unrealistically simple, first because of the aim the model was designed 
to fulfil, but also because of the important changes the financial 
markets endured until the late eighties, precluding a detailed 
description of. the financial markets (see [11]). Lack of data was the 
main factor behind the original specification of this block. 
Two possible monetary policy settings were defined: an exogenous 
long-term interest rate, or an exogenous M2 supply. When interest 
rates were stable, a demand for real M2 was included in the model; when 
M2 was exogenous, an equation linking the long-term interest rate to M2 
(and other variables) replaced the other equation. Both were roughly 
the inverse of the other equation. A further equation explained the 
demand for liquid assets other than M2 included in ALP, the broadest 
aggregate. M2 was perfectly controlled by the monetary authority -once 
exogenous-, but the full aggregate ALP was always determined within 
the model. A PPP equation was used for the exchange rate, although 
most simulations were carried out with fixed nominal exchange rates. 
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This particular financial block is being overhauled, with the 
inclusion of a demand for ALP compatible with the standard framework 
at the Bank of Spain, the inclusion of credit demand, and a full 
endogenisation of net financial wealth. Carrying out the current 
exercise with liquid assets modelled as two separate components, 
though, is not a major problem, as its goal is carefully to decompose the 
channels of transmission of monetary policy. Our purpose is to analyse 
the agents' decision-taking process, not to try to forecast the 
behaviour of a particular monetary aggregate. 
Ongoing financial deregulation in Spain has had a strong impact 
on the conduct of monetary policy. The general framework used for the 
current exercise, for which the block has been revised, is that of a 
central bank that issues or withdraws money through the interbank 
lending market. The central bank controls the money it supplies 
adjusting an intervention rate (the 3-month interbank lending rate, one 
of the most directly affected by actual intervention rates, see (2), the 
only short-term interest rate appearing in the model. The other two 
important interest rates that have a role in the model, the banking 
institution deposits rate and the medium- to long-term public debt 
implied rate -including only public debt in domestic private hands-, 
react to changes in the intervention rate and the short-term interest 
rate of the DM and Dollar in the Euromarket. The implied rate of the 
gross public debt moves closely in line with the long-term interest rate. 
This framework is only valid starting in the latter half of the eighties, 
so the new equations included in the model cover a short span of time, 
and their statistical strength is a matter for conjecture. It is, though, 
as good a representation of the current procedure for conducting 
monetary policy as can be obtained today. 
There is some criticism as to the appropriateness of the financial 
block described. First, because data on monetary aggregates -starting 
in 1964- include a long period of strong government intervention and 
barely significant financial markets. Interest rates of all kinds, too, 
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were mainly set by the authorities. Second, because the extremely 
recent but deep-seated deregulation process is still affecting the 
elasticities in the equations involved in the block, and may strongly 
affect the size and timing of the simulated shock for the period for 
which the simulations have been carried out. In order to ease this 
issue, some experimentation was performed with other models used in 
the Research Department of the Bank of Spain, and a check was made 
that interest rate responses were very similar in all cases. As expected, 
there were some differences in the behaviour of the monetary 
aggregates (ALP) and in the impact of the simulated shock on real 
output and inflation, a1though'the MOISEES model may be depicting 
these last two variables better. 
1. 4. Planned improvementa. 
As mentioned, the model is undergoing a major revision. Its 
current version includes a totally new demand block, with equations not 
only re-estimated but re-specified: consumption is now split into 
durables and non-durables, although an equation for total consumption 
remains for certain specific simulations; residential investment includes 
a housing price variable linked to financial variables; imports are split 
into energy and non-energy imports, etc. The supply block is being 
totally rewritten in a more traditional framework, placing special 
emphasis on explicitly modelling a tradables and a non-tradables 
(protected) sector. The financial block will be re-estimated along the 
lines defined by the financial model used for monetary programming, 
and will explicitly model the behaviour of banking institutions, 
including both the monetary aggregates and their counterparts -
banking sector credits-, and the inter-relatedness of interest rates. 
The current exercise may serve as a stepping-stone in this process. 
An additional but important improvement ranking high on our 
agenda is the change of data frequency. Most of the new equations have 
been estimated in both annual and quarterly data. Unfortunately, the 
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Spanish Quarterly National Accounts are still incomplete. 
2. Simulations. 
Besides the changes and improvements currently being 
introduced into the model, the relative scantness of its current financial 
block prompted the idea that some sort of enrichment was needed for 
this exercise. First, it was necessary to link the exchange rate to the 
foreign interest rate differential. Next, the transmission mechanism 
linking the intervention rate and other domestic interest rates had to 
be greatly improved, in order to substantiate the overall behaviour of 
the financial block. Finally, the neutral fiscal policy envisaged in the 
first exposition of the exercise led us to experiment with different 
behaviours of direct taxes, as they are currently much too sensitive to 
the general (nominal) level of activity. 
2. 1. Changes undertaken for the exercise. 
The first step was to stretch the baseline until at least the year 
2000. This was done by first tailoring the Bank of Spain forecast, 
closely in line with the government's convergence plan, to the 
requirements of the model; and further, to extend it to the year 2020, 
in order to be able to analyse the long-run behaviour of the model. We 
needed a reliable test of the long-run neutrality of a monetary shock, 
something we expect from our models, to increase our confidence in the 
ou tcome of the exercise. This check was made necessary by the changes 
implemented in the financial block that will be explained later. 
Once this step had been covered, the exchange rate depreciation 
had to be related to changes in the foreign interest rate differential. 
The model originally included a PPP relationship, a not very helpful 
equation for this exercise but a tried and tested one. It was decided to 
use it to model agents' expectations about a future depreciation of the 
peseta, in order to avoid a future exchange rate irrevocably fixed by 
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monetary authorities. The changes included the modelling of expected 
currency depreciation with the help of the PPP equation, and the 
definition of an actual depreciation compatible with the expected future 
exchange rate and the interest rate differential. Agents in the economy 
perfectly forecast the exchange rate given the baseline monetary 
policy, and the current exchange rate is depreciated in order to ensure 
both that expectations are fulfilled and that actual depreciation 
coincides with the interest rate differential with the rest of the world. 
As agents never forecast the monetary policy (they always think it will 
return to baseline), the monetary authority is able to appreciate the 
peseta by a given amount, but at the cost of ever increasing domestic 
interest rates. It should be stressed that agents never revise their 
expected future monetary policy, but they adjust their exchange rate 
expectations should this policy actually change. This means that the 
credibility of the monetary authorities never changes but always 
coincides with the credibility level implied in the baseline . 
Another absolutely necessary change was to streamline better the 
relationships among different domestic interest rates. The model 
originally had two possible monetary policy settings: either the central 
bank decided on the level of supply of M2, or the decisions were taken 
in terms of stabilising the long-term interest rate. The deposits rate 
was then linked to the long-term rate by a simple reaction function. The 
first step for improving this set-up was to include a short-term interest 
rate, for which the 3-month intervention rate was chosen, and to 
include statistically-sound equations linking all the different interest 
rates. The mechanism finally implemented is the following: the long­
term interest rate is set according to the domestic short-term interest 
rate (long-run coefficient of around 0.65) and the foreign interest rate 
(long-run coefficient of 0. 35); the deposit rate is explained by the 
short-term and long-term interest rates, the former with a greater 
weight. 
Other changes considered but not finally adopted were a more 
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neutral fiscal policy and the definition of monetary policy targeting in 
terms of real as opposed to nominal interest rates. Direct taxes as 
modeled are not only affected by the level of activity; they are also very 
sensitive to changes in inflation. Their first re-specification embodied 
inflation-neutral direct taxes, but historical data did not support this 
as a good mechanism to isolate them from inflation; an ad-hoc gradual 
return to baseline deficit over GDP was then tried, but the response 
was slow and mainly felt beyond the year 2000. Finally, direct taxes 
were left untouched. 
2. 2. Description of the simulated shocks. 
The two exercises finally undertaken incorporated all the changes 
described. They are a temporary increase in the intervention rate of 
100 basis points in 1994 and 1995, and an immediate return to baseline 
afterwards; and the same shock with a stable nominal exchange rate, 
thanks to a suitable path of foreign interest rates. Results are 
presented for the period 1994 to 2000, although simulations have 
spanned the full baseline length. It is worth noting that the way the 
exchange rate has been modeled precludes a simple exogenisation of the 
variable (as the PPP equation now plays the role of the expectations­
formation mechanism); alternatively, it was preferred to endogenise' 
the foreign interest rate in order to neutralise the two factors affecting 
the exchange rate in the model: the interest rate differential in the 
short run, and the inflation differential in the long run. Obviously, 
this has consequences that affect the whole simulation. 
2. 3. Summary of simulation resulta. 
As the two simulations have many points in common, it is probably 
preferable to give a broader account of the first one, which we think is 
1 Rather, the exchange rate equation was inverted in order to have the 
foreign interest rate as the left-hand variable. 
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the most appropriate. The second simulation will be discussed only when 
significant departures arise. The last sub-section will address 
additional evidence obtained by repeating the simulations with small 
changes in the shock definition, the specification of the model or the 
time horizon. 
2. 3. 1. Asymmetric simulation. 
Results of the first simulation will be discussed adhering closely 
to the structure of tables II and III. 
2. 3. 1. 1. Table II. 
As previously stated, the 3-month interbank lending rate will 
play in these simulations the role of the policy-set intervention rate. As 
it is the only short-term interest rate included in the model, the first 
two lines of the table coincide. They directly show the simulated shock. 
The long-term interest rate is the medium- to long-term public 
debt interest rate. It is linked to the domestic and foreign short-term 
interest rates, increasing some 65 basis points given a sustained shock 
such as the simulated one. The dynamics of the equation prevent a full 
impact from being reached, increasing only 48 basis points in 1995 
before beginning a gentle return to baseline. 
Deposit rates are somewhat less sensitive to· the short-term 
interest rate, but short-run dynamics are stronger. This is the factor 
explaining the greater inertia of these rates as compared to the long-· 
term rates. They, too, gently return to baseline once the shock is 
reversed. 
Real interest rates are more sluggish than their nomlnal 
counterparts. This is something arguably legitimate, as nothing 
prevents real interest rates from having more inertia in the short run 
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than nominal interest rates. But it is worth pointing out that the return 
of real interest rates to baseline is faster if the real intervention rate 
is the variable targeted by the monetary authority. Real interest rates 
rebound after 1996, a move generated by the reversal of the shock in 
that year, but this rebound slowly subsides afterwards. The user cost 
of capital moves broadly in line with the long-term real interest rate. 
The nominal exchange rate moves according to two factors: the 
increase in domestic Interest rates and the fall in domestic inflation. 
The real exchange rate virtually mimics the short-term interest rate 
behaviour, as should be expected. The small differences arise because 
of the dynamics in the PPP equation, a full return to baseline being 
achieved after the year 2000. 
The new path of the wealth variable is mainly explained by 
changes in households' liquid assets holdings. 
Net interest and dividend payments in the household sector move 
in line with changes in deposit rates and money demand. Dividend 
payments In real terms react to changes in real economic activity, but 
are on the other hand not very sensitive to interest rates. They may be 
under-reacting in this simulation, but changes in their equation, 
although considered, have finally been dropped. Net interest and 
dividend payments abroad move in line with the exchange rate; their 
Inclusion In the table Is only for the sake of completeness. 
Two measures of real monetary aggregates are shown: ALP 
(roughly equivalent to M4) and M2. ALP moves in line with M2, one of 
their components, but liquid assets other than M2 strongly affect them. 
M2 falls as the alternative interest rate increases (there is no M2 'own' 
interest rate in the model), and reverts to baseline when this movement 
is reversed. ALP bounces back, as a consequence, because of the 
implied movement in liquid assets other than M2. These other liquid 
assets jump -mainly in the second year- as their own Interest rate 
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increases, make a gentle return to baseline afterwards, and finally 
shoot up again thanks to the fall in inflation. As inflation falls, part of 
the household assets' demand shifts to liquid assets. 
2. 3. 1. 2. Table III. 
GOP falls slightly for the whole period, a tendency towards a 
return to baseline appearing at the end of the simulation. The 
fluctuations it suffers, though, are odd-looking. Two factors explain 
this: the behaviour of consumption, and particularly its sensitivity to 
changes in wealth; and the behaviour of imports, itself mainly linked to 
changes In business investment. GOP falls the first year by 0. 05%, 
almost returns to basellne the following year, has a stronger negative 
impact on the fourth year, and gently returns to baseline afterwards. 
Although many of these movements can be explained by the consumption 
path, they are misleadingly small thanks to the trade balance 
behaviour: the fall In domestic demand these years is much stronger. 
The trade balance is itself driven by imports, which are extremely 
responsive in the short run to changes in business investment. As can 
be seen, the fall in business investment almost parallels the fall in 
imports, both factors almost cancelling each other out. 
The most troublesome GOP component Is no doubt private 
consumption. It is negatively affected by the increase in interest rates, 
but positively affected by the increase in financial wealth and dividend 
and interest payments to households. The appreciation of domestic 
currency helps further to explain Its bebaviour. The final outcome is 
a wandering path for consumption, sometimes above baseline, sometimes 
under it. The two cases when consumption departs most from its 
original values, in 1995 and 1997, arise when the full impact of the 
increase in wealth (1995) or its fall (1997) is felt, wealth being directly 
affected by changes In the monetary policy. Other major determinants 
of the increase in consumption in the final years are the ever-falling 
direct taxes, the main factor explaining the increase In disposable 
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income these years. 
Government expenditure (government consumption plus 
investment) first increases then decreases, very gently in both cases. 
The main factor behind this is the nominal rigidity affecting most of the 
expenditure components in the model. Expenditures such as welfare 
benefits, government investment, and others, are affected by 
unforeseen changes in inflation. 
Total gross private investment falls, driven mainly by business 
investment, as residential investment increases slightly as a result of 
the increase in household disposable income. The fall in business 
investment arises because of the fall in GOP and the increase in the user 
cost of capital. Changes in inventories are related to the gap between 
supply and demand, as both aggregates are independently determined 
in the model. Although inventories always return to baseline, they may 
be sluggish in doing so. 
Exports closely follow the changes in competitiveness, losing 
ground in 1994-1995, and recovering afterwards. Real exports 
eventually return to baseline, but not before the end of the simulation, 
as the real exchange rate has not yet returned to base in 2000. Imports 
are strongly affected by the fall in business investment. 
Inflation is constantly below base, but a return to its original 
values is ultimately achieved around the year 2008, the biggest 
difference from the baseline arising in 1998. The final effect on prices 
is, as a consequence, a negative step of about 2.5% of their baseline 
value. This process is fairly understandable, as the temporary increase 
in the intervention rate amounts to a negative permanent shift in money 
supply. The biggest drop in inflation occurs five years after the shock, 
but it is significant after some two years. One key point explaining 
price movements is the increasing gap between domestic producer prices 
and consumer prices, as �he share of imports in consumption is 
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relatively large. This factor strongly helps to reduce labour costs 
measured in producer prices without detriment to the labour market, as 
pay measured in terms of the consumption deflator is only marginally 
affected. The only thing preventing a stable real wage in CPI terms is 
the slightly higher unemployment rate. Most of the exchange rate 
appreciation effect unfolds in the long-run through this channel. Real 
consumption wages go back to baseline by 2002. 
Import prices move in line with the exchange rate, as they are 
exogenous measured in foreign currency. 
Government accounts are negatively and permanently affected, 
the fiscal deficit undergoing a lasting downward fall of around 0.3% of 
GDP. Government expenditures consist of government consumption and 
investment, welfare benefits of all kinds, and smaller items. Although 
the first component is mainly (but not only) driven by compensation to 
civil servants J the rest of the components are chosen in nominal terms 
the year before they are actually spent. If an unforeseen inflation 
surge occurs, they will marginally grow in real terms. Government 
revenues, on the other hand, include the public sector disposable 
income without welfare benefits and net interest payments, which is the 
third component of government accounts shown in the table. Both net 
interest payments and direct taxes are heavily affected by the increase 
in interest rates, the former directly and also through the increase in 
public debt, the latter due to its high inflation-dependence. The growth 
in interest payments is specially strong as compared to the GDP growth, 
although in absolute terms both revenues and expenditures fall by a 
larger amount. 
Finally, the current account is mainly explained by the track 
followed by the trade balance: an improvement in the initial years, a 
deterioration afterwards. As exports wander around their haseline 
values, imports are the key factor justifying the trade balance path. As 
earlier mentioned, the fall and subsequent recovery of imports is caused 
- 20-
by the important changes in business investment. The foreign sector in 
the MOl SEES model is a key growth-limiting factor when demand shocks 
occur. This seems to be a characteristic of the Spanish economy, rather 
than a troublesome attribute of the model; nevertheless, the model may 
be over-stating it. 
In short, there are three points worth remembering in this 
simulation: the sluggish inflation-adjustment in the Spanish economy, 
though this adjustment is complete in the end; the great importance of 
business investment and of imports in the transmission of the monetary 
shock; and, finally, the strong short-run effect and significant 
medium-term effect of the exchange rate. These conclusions are, of 
course, only related to the Spanish economy inasmuch as the model is 
a good representation of the economy. 
2. 3. 2. Symmetric simulation. 
A second simulation was attempted disregarding the exchange rate 
effects. The first impression was that exogenising the nominal exchange 
rate would settle the matter and allow a repetition of the former 
simulation avoiding exchange rate effects. But this is not a correct 
solution for a model such as MOISEES, because its particular framework 
precludes a stable exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. 
As already stated, the original PPP equation is now the expectation­
formation mechanism agents use to forecast future exchange rates, and 
it is understandably rational and desirable that agents should persist 
in forecasting. It is necessary, then, to devise ways to stabilise the 
exchange rate while retaining its equation. This can be achieved in the 
short run by imposing a shift in the foreign interest rate so that the 
interest rate differential remains unaffected. Unfortunately, agents wllI 
expect a future appreciation on the basis of an anticipated fall in future 
inflation. Two factors can stop this currency appreciation from actually 
happening: either domestic interest rates are allowed to fall -and this 
contradicts the simulated shock itself-, or foreign interest rates are 
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allowed to increase. The third alternative, having foreign prices 
decrease in line with domestic prices, was ruled out. 
The decision finally adopted was to endogenise foreign interest 
rates so as to impose a constant nominal exchange rate. Agents I 
decision-making is not then directly affected, as would have happened 
with an exogenous exchange rate. The final path of the foreign interest 
rate was subject to two independent but simultaneous pressures: first, 
an increase of 100 basis points in 1994 and 1995, to balance the parallel 
increase in domestic interest rates; second, an increasing divergence 
from baseline to balance the fall in the inflation differential with the rest 
of the world. The final situation is that of an artificial appreciation of 
foreign currencies in relation to the peseta. As the increase in foreign 
interest rates tightens the monetary conditions, it helps reduce the 
domestic inflation level and widen the inflation differential. This is 
clearly a non-sustainable policy. We hope, nevertheless, that results 
for the first four or five years will remain meaningful, and that this 
procedure will be more attractive than simply exogenising the nominal 
exchange rate. 
The simulation finally undertaken is a temporary increase of 100 
basis points of the intervention rate, in 1994-1995, and an immediate 
return to baseline. This move is complemented by an increase in the 
foreign interest rate that stabilises the nominal exchange rate for the 
whole simulation, but otherwise allows agents freely to forecast future 
exchange rates. 
Basically, the outcome differs from the former simulation in two 
respects: first, the sustained increase in long-term interest rates has 
a stronger negative impact on the economy, particularly on business 
investment and imports; second, the fall in inflation is stronger and 
long-lasting. The increase in the foreign interest rate pushes domestic 
long-term interest rates and the user cost of capital up, increasing 
their differential with short-term rates. Falling imports and the gains 
-22 -
in competitiveness help in creating a sustained current account­
surplus. 
Focusing on the first four years of the simulation, which are 
broadly similar in both exercises, the main differences lie in the 
behaviour of long-term interest rates and of the exchange rate. Long­
term interest rates increase more than in the former simulation because 
of the concurrent increase in foreign and domestic short-term interest 
rates. The resulting user cost of capita! is higher, too, and business 
investment is very negatively affected. As before, the induced fall in 
imports strongly smooths the fall in GDP. On the other hand, the 
stability of the exchange rate during these initial years of the 
simulation, as opposed to the strong appreciation in the other 
simulation, induces a better behaviour in exports. The trade balance 
improves sharply and lastingly, a distinct feature of this exercise. 
Another point worth noting is the behaviour of unit labour costs. 
In the current simulation, import prices are not allowed to decrease in 
the early years, and the gap between producer prices and consumer 
prices remains almost at its baseline value. As unemployment has 
increased by a large amount, the fall in real labour costs measured in 
terms of consumption prices is now relatively sizable. This outlines the 
importance of the gap between production and consumption deflators in 
a medium-size economy such as Spain, and of the share of imports in 
consumption. 
As in the other simulation, the trade balance has a significant 
dampening effect, the final impact on GDP being again misleadingly 
small. 
2. 3. 3. Additional evidence. 
Results have been reported until the year 2000, but the actual 
simulations were carried out for the full baseline time span (1994-2020). 
-23-
This has allowed long-run analyses of policy impacts to be performed, 
and some aspects of the general design of both exercises that were 
potentially troublesome have been outlined. The first one is the large 
long-run impact of the non-neutral fiscal policy; the second one is the 
inconsistent monetary policy implied in the simulations, as the central 
bank decides its moves in terms of nominal rates in situations of 
ev?lving inflations. Both factors worked in the same direction, inducing 
significant oscillations around the baseline from the year 2008-2010, and 
delaying a· return to baseline. A monetary policy set in terms of real 
intervention rates combined with a more neutral fiscal policy radically 
changed the final part of the simulation, producing a smoother 
transition to equilibrium. This monetary policy was incompatible with 
the exercise, and was merely adopted for the gathering of additional 
evidence. 
Some simUlations were performed with different direct tax rules, 
in order to ease the non-neutrality of fiscal policy. After much testing, 
the most satisfactory of them was a derivation of the original reaction 
function that ensured a gradual return to the baseline ratio of direct 
taxes over GDP. Unfortunately, the time taken for this outline to work 
out, forcing a return to the aforementioned baseline ratio, was such 
that no relevant differences in results were found by the year 2000. 
The outline was finally dropped, but we have been very careful in 
stressing the importance of the non-neutrality of fiscal policy wherever 
it was felt necessary. 
Another more fruitful experiment involved repeating the 
asymmetric simulation -the first one- starting in different years, in 
order to measure the importance of the business cycle in the model and, 
hopefully, in the economy. The simulation was repeated starting every 
year from 1986 to 1994, each time with a seven-year horizon to match the 
original shock definition. Figure 1 shows the consecutive paths for the 
GDP deflator inflation rate for each simulation; figure 2 shows the 
percentage deviations of real GDP itself. In general terms, 1989 may be 
- 24-
considered as the peak and 1993 as the trough in the Spanish business 
cycle, with 1987 and 1990-1991 as turning points. 
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The general conclusion that can be drawn from the experiment is 
the relatively long lags needed by a monetary shock to be fully felt , 
either in inflation or activity. Almost nothing happens the first two 
years, and five years elapse before the shock is reversed and a gentle 
return to baseline commences. Another striking point is the extreme 
importance of a correct timing of monetary policy changes. In general 
terms , the model implies that these policy changes may be dealt with at 
least two years in advance of the actual inflation surge happening: the 
position in the business cycle two to five years after the original shock 
is given determines the strength of the response. Unfortunately, the 
model implies that the bigger the fall in inflation, the bigger the 
disruption in real economic activity. It may be stressed, though, that 
the simulated shock may not be the most appropriate description of 
monetary shocks as they actually unfold . 
3. Decomposition of the channels of transmisaion. 
The discussion in the previous section is meant to be of use for 
understanding the mechanisms set in motion by the monetary shock , at 
least as the model describes them. Some key points have already been 
made, such as the apparent importance of the impact on business 
investment or the discernible effect of changes in the exchange rate. 
But further insight can be obtained by a close scrutioy of the workings 
of each identifiable channel of transmission. Focusing on the impact of 
the simulated shock on economic activity -real output- , this section will 
try to evaluate the relative importance of some of the . most relevant 
monetary policy transmission channels . It has to be stressed that no 
channel-decomposition will be attempted with the impact on prices, 
although this is a sensible analysis to perform. This has been a choice , 
rather than an imposition, as the techniques that will be described in 
the next few pages can be employed for all kinds of decomposition. 
In a highly aggregated and non-linear model such as MOISEES, 
it is impossible to decompose solely the final impact into a number of 
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complementary channels of transmission. First of all, non-linearity 
precludes independent channels that add up exactly to the full impact ; 
furthermore , the chosen channels may not be the only ones . It is 
necessary, then, to decide what channels are worth describing, and in 
a second step precisely to define them and the way they are to be 
isolated. In short, we need to implement a particular mechanism to 
identify the agreed-upon channels, even though there may be no 
consensus on the relevant channels nor the appropriateness of the 
method. The decomposition adopted for this exercise, whose results will 
be discussed , has been implemented by means of repeating the 
asymmetric simulation -the first one-, shutting down each time all the 
channels except the one under scrutiny (see [9]). Results are then 
compared to the baseline. An alternative was to simulate with all the 
channels at work except one, and compare results with the full impact 
case. Both methods numerically coincide in a linear model . 
After a careful study of the model, the following channels were 
found to be decomposable : 
- a substitution effect in consumption ; 
- an income effect in consumption and residential investment; 
- a wealth effect, again in consumption ; 
- a user-cost-of-capltal effect in business investment; 
- an exchange-rate effect; 
- and a public-debt effect, independent from the wealth effect. 
As the last one did not greatly affect results, its decomposition 
was finally abandoned. Consideration was given, but finally dropped, 
to including the substitution effect and the user-cost-of-capital effect 
under a single heading. Each channel was decomposed exogenising the 
right variables in the right equations :  the direct impact of interest 
rates on consumption as substitution effect; dividend and net interest 
payments as income effect; wealth and the inflation tax in consumption 
as wealth effect; and so on. Each time, the variable exogenised was the 
- 27-
intervention rate or a closely related interest rate . For instance , the 
exchange-rate effect was decomposed exogenising the domestic short­
term interest rate in the exchange rate behavioural equation, but 
allowing it to adjust to PPP factors . As a check on the soundness of the 
outline , we verified that GDP was not affected by this particular change 
in monetary policy when all the channels were shut down . 
Table IV shows tpe resulting decomposition in terms of the 
contribution of each variable to the change in GDP. It is easy to verify 
that all the channels do not add up to the full effect, and sometimes the 
discrepancy is rather large . The exercise , though, remains meaningful 
in general terms , and the hints offered by a close analysis of the table 
are worth the trouble. As additional evidence was gathered by 
repeating the exercise with different decomposition strategies, the 
following lines will confine the discussion to the features common to all 
of the decompositions addressed. 
First and foremost, the user-cost-of-capital channel is the most 
striking feature of the table . Its full impact in the short run is 
relatively small, but only because of the sharp decrease in imports that 
almost compensates for the fall in investment. As the short-run 
movement in imports is driven by business investment itself J the user­
cost-of-capital effect is clearly the most powerful channel of 
transmission . As imports return to their new long-run equilibrium 
level, the user-cost-of-capital effect emerges as the one most affecting 
GDP. 
The second most important channel is very probably the 
exchange-rate channel. The exchange rate works through the model in 
two different directions : it immediately alters the trade balance through 
changes in competitiveness, and it sets labour costs in motion as the 
gap between consumption prices and output prices changes. The share 
of imports in consumption turns out to be an important factor in the 
model in explaining the rather deep and long-lasting effect of this 
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channel, a most understandable feature for a medium-size open economy 
such as Spaints. 
The wealth channel mostly affects the economy through sharp but 
short-lived changes in consumption. These changes are a direct 
consequence of the high short-run elasticity of wealth accelerations in 
the consumption function, mostly felt in 1995 and in 1997, the years 
following the shock itself and its reversal . The importance of this 
channel is probably related to the specification of the consumption 
equation , and may accordingly be over-stated. The rest of the channels 
are of lesser importance, the only point worth noting being the changes 
in the income effect when the decomposition strategy is changed . This 
channel does not appear as significant in the table shown, but this is 
not the case for other decompositions -where it has a meagre positive 
impact in the initial years-, although it always remains a small-size 
channel. 
Two likely misleading factors in the exercise that are worthy of 
mention are the very small size of the shocks we are trying to 
decompose, and the sensitivity of some of them to small changes in the 
decomposition strategy or in the specification of the model. Both 
characteristics may imply that some of the decomposed channels are 
dependent on the model, and only faintly related to the economy . The 
whole table , indeed, may be totally misleading or inaccurate. There is, 
though , a robust fact that withstands these considerations : the 
importance of the user-cost-of-capital channel and the exchange-rate 
channel . Both channels have constantly remained the most significant 
channels in all the derivations of the original exercise that have been 
undertaken . The general feeling is, then, that this exercise reveals 
some important factors of the Spanish economy . 
4 .  Main conciuaions. 
One of the main drawbacks of macroeconomic models is their 
- 29 -
inability to give a detailed picture of the impact of a specific shock . One 
of their main strengths , however , is their ability to take into account 
all the possible channels of transmission at the same time , even though 
some channels may be better modelled than others . The main aim of the 
current exercise is to describe these channels when a monetary policy 
shock is faced , and the way they work in the model, relating these 
points to the real behaviour of the economy. The MOISEES model 
describes an economy with a slow inflation-adjusting process when a 
monetary shock occurs , but eventually leading to a full return of output 
to its baseline value . The shock affects demand in the short run mainly 
through business investment , although the extremely sensitive imports 
help reduce the initial impact . The exchange rate is an important factor 
both in the short run, where it affects the trade balance , and the 
medium term , as the gap between real labour costs and real take-home 
pay varies . Different decompositions of the channels of transmission 
have coherently shown that the user-cost-of-capital channel -related 
to business investment- and the exchange-rate channel are the most 
important ones . This is probably the outstanding feature of the 
exercise. 
Other important evidence is the extreme sensitivity of the impact 
to the business cycle . Neither inflation nor output are noticeably 
affected until at least two years have elapsed from the actual shock 
occurring, but afterwards the size of the impact is strongly and 
directly related to the cycle . The implication of this sensitivity is that 
monetary policy has to be set around two years in ad vance. of the 
inflation surge . Unfortunately, we have not been able to analyse the 
impact of a change in the credibility of the central bank , which is 
probably a most relevant factor . 
The exercise is not problem-free, and this is a point that must not 
be concealed . The impact on GDP is too small to be considered as totally 
accurate , or unaffected by the specific implementation of the shock. 
The financial block , though fine-tuned for this exercise, is still too 
- 30 -
sketchy, and lacks some important refinements. Further, the financial 
deregulation process still taking place in Spain may be affecting the size 
and timing of the impact. On the other hand, a number of different 
studies, not directly related to this one, show evidence that do not 
contradict our main results. We feel, therefore, that these results 
outline facts that pertain to the Spanish economy, and that the exercise 
is in general meaningful. 
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